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The Abolition of the
Party-Witness Disqualification:
An Historical Survey
By JOEL N. BODANSKY*
INTRODUCTION

The exclusion of particular classes of testimony remains at
the heart of the law of evidence. One former basis for exclusion,
however, has disappeared: the testimonial disqualification of the
parties to a judicial proceeding and others interested in the outcome of the case. The extent to which the testimony of such persons is today accepted as a matter of course may obscure the fact
that, at one time, the extension of competency provoked bitter
controversy and was regarded by contemporaries as one of the
most significant procedural reforms of the day. This article
examines the period-chiefly the second half of the nineteenth
century-during which this change was effected, focusing on
both the pattern of reform and the scope and flavor of the debate
between the supporters and the opponents of change.'
This debate, however, did not occur in a vacuum. It was
played out, particularly in the case of the extension of competency to the criminally accused, against a background of institutional change-e.g., the increased professionalism of the criminal justice system, including the increased use of lawyers in judicial proceedings-and generalized concerns over the merits and
function of the adversary system-e.g., the allocation of burdens
of proof, the roles of judge and jury, and the questioning of criminal defendants. The importance of these factors is suggested in

J.D. 1981, University of Chicago. Law clerk to Hon. Dolores K. Sloviter, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. This article was originally written as a seminar
paper at the University of Chicago Law School. The author would like to thank Professor
John H. Langbein of the University of Chicago Law School for his suggestion of the topic
and for his guidance during the preparation of this article.
1 The two most complete general discussions of this subject are 2 J. WIGMOR, EVIDENCE §§ 575-587 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIcMOaE], and Justice Brennan's

majority opinion in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-87 (1961).
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this article; however, their full significance and the precise interrelationship between them remains a subject for further study.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Wigmore attributes to the late sixteenth century2 the first ar-

ticulation of the rule barring the sworn testimony of parties to
civil actions and traces its origin to the contest between jury trial
and the older procedure of wager of law. 3 By the seventeenth
century, the disqualification of the parties had become rooted in
the idea that persons with a stake in the outcome of a suit could
not be trusted to tell the truth, so that exclusion was necessary to
prevent them from "sliding into perjury" and to protect the court
from deception. 4 Based on this rationale, the rule was extended
in the mid-seventeenth century to disqualify interested non-party
witnesses. 5

The conscious extension of the rule to exclude the testimony
of criminal defendants came slightly later. In criminal trials, the
accused had of necessity taken an active part in his defense, since
initially both his right to counsel and his right to call witnesses on
his behalf were severely restricted. 6 The accused was not sworn,
but neither, until the beginning of the eighteenth century, were
any of his witnesses. Only with the statutes of 1695 and 1701,
which allowed the defendant's witnesses to be sworn in cases of
treason and felony, was the distinction between the testimonial
role of the accused and the ordinary witness brought into focus:
the accused could speak, but not under oath. This difference was

22 WICMORE, supra note 1, § 575, at 680. For a general discussion of the early history of the rule, see 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 193-97 (1938).
3 See 2 WIGMORE, supranote 1, § 575, at 681-82:

The party's oath, then, had no place in trial by jury; its appropriate place
was in a distinct mode of trial, wager of law. It can hardly be anything but
this contrast which explains the determined struggle to retain the privilege of

wager of law; it was the sole proceeding in which a party could have the
benefit of his own oath ...
Id. at 682.
4 See id. at 677; 2 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 576, at 686 (quoting GILBERT ON EviDENCE (1727)).
5 2 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 575, at 679-80.
6 See id. at 684-86; Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. at 573-74.
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explained in terms of the accused's interest in the outcome of the

trial. 7
During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the
common law rule of disqualification for interest enjoyed largely

unquestioned dominance. Then, in the space of roughly fifty
years, it was abolished by statute in nearly every common law
jurisdiction. In England, competency was recognized for inter-

ested witnesses who were not parties by Lord Denman's Act in
1843, for civil parties in 1851 with the passage of Lord

Brougham's Act, and for criminal defendants by the Criminal
Evidence Act of 1898. In the United States, a similar pattern of
abolition occurred, although generally compressed into a shorter
time frame. Statutes to establish competency were first adopted
for non-party interested witnesses in Michigan in 1846, for civil
parties in Connecticut in 1849, and for criminal defendants in

Maine in 1864. At the federal level, civil parties in federal courts
were rendered competent by an 1864 Act of Congress, and criminal defendants by an 1878 Act. By 1885, the common law disqualification had been removed in every state except Alabama,
Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.8 By 1900, only Georgia
retained the common law rule, and then only for criminal defendants, an anomaly which continued until 1962 when, in response
to the Supreme Court's opinion in Ferguson v. Georgia,9 the
Georgia Legislature rendered criminal defendants competent. 10
7 See 365 U.S. at 574; PHILLIPPS ON EVIDENCE 52 (5th Am. ed. 1868).
8 For a complete list of the dates by which each state had enacted its general competency statute, see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. at 577 n.6.
Wigmore attributed the slower course of reform in the Southern States to the
greater predominance there of "the control of mere emotion and partisanship over conduct and opinion," which he viewed as underlying the common law rules of incompetency. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 576, at 691; 2 WGMORE, supra note 1, § 579, at 701.
See note 13 infra for a discussion of Wigmore's view of the role of scientific rationalism in
bringing about reform. While this explanation is not satisfying, a more plausible one is difficult to discover. It is tempting to seek the explanation in the greater influence of class and
particularly race consciousness in the South, but such an approach seems to be undermined by the timing of reform. In general, the period of reform in most of the Northern
States corresponds to the period of Reconstruction; reform in the South generally did not
fully occur until the post-Reconstruction period.
9 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
10 1962 GA. LAWS No. 671, at 133, § 1.
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REFORM IN CIVIL TRIALs

The attack on the interest disqualification was launched by
Jeremy Bentham" and continued by his disciples (Lords Denman
and Brougham in England, Edward Livingston and John Appleton in the United States). The reformers' central argument was
that the exclusion of testimony hindered the "great object of judicial investigation, the discovery of the truth."' 2 They perceived
that the exclusion rested on two assumptions, both of which they
rejected: first, that the interest of a person in the outcome of a
case would ordinarily lead him to commit perjury and, second,
that the perjury, if attempted, would be undetected by the finder
of fact. 13

As to the first of these assumptions, Bentham replied, "To reject as unworthy of credit the evidence of every man who has any
n Bentham's argument is posed most fully in J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL

(1827).
12 E. LIVINGSTON, INTRODUCTORY REPORT TO THE CODE OF EVIDENCE [OF LOUISIANA] [circa 1830], reprintedin 1 COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL
JURISPRUDENCE 411,424 (1873) [hereinafter cited as LIVINcSTON; all subsequent references
EVIDENCE

are to the 1873 reprint].
13
See, e.g., [NEW YORK] COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, CODE OF PRoCEDURE (First Report) 247 (1848) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. COMMISSIONERS]; LIVINGSTON,
supra note 12, at 424-25. The driving force behind the New York Commission, and one of
the co-authors of its report, was David Dudley Field. The reforms proposed by the New
York Commission were influential in other states.
Wigmore emphasized the first of these assumptions in explaining the rapid and
widespread acceptance of the reformers' position. He suggested that the assumption that a
person's interest in a case would lead him to perjure himself reflected the "much stronger
influence, up to the 1800's, of the emotional element in all human conduct." 2 WIGMORE,
supra note 1, § 576, at 690. According to Wigmore, it was only in the nineteenth century
that "the influence of scientific research and of industrial invention and organization [had]
made for a more rational and less emotional life," thus creating a climate of opinion more
receptive to the notion that persons would not inevitably distort the truth under the influence of partisan feelings. Id, at 691. To the extent that a new spirit of scientific rationalism
played any'role in the abolition of the common law rules of incompetency, however, it
was probably as much by fostering a faith in the ability of the jury to discern the truth
when presented with all of the relevant evidence as it was by causing a transformation in
human conduct.
Wigmore also suggested that it was not until the nineteenth century that confidence in the jury's ability to critically evaluate a witness' testimony without giving undue
weight to the fact of his oath gained prevalence. Id.
For an alternative view of the reasons for the receptiveness in the nineteenth century to legal reform, see J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 186-88
(2d ed. 1979).
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pecuniary interest, even the most trifling, in the cause, is a debasing and injurious distrust, which supposes men to be worse

than they are, according to the usual average of morality."'" The
common law exclusion was criticized by others as overly broad,
for it not only failed to distinguish between degrees of interest

and differences in character, but also failed to take into account
those who, even if tempted, would be deterred from perjury

either by the sanction of the oath or the fear of detection.' 5 In
Livingston's view it was illogical to "exclude all interested testimony... [blecause a part only is unworthy of credit;" 16the better course was to allow the testimony and leave the determination of the credit it deserved to the factfinder, who "can
do

. .

. effectually, that which the legislative rule does imper-

fectly- . . . let in the interested testimony which is worthy of
17
credit, and exclude that which is not."'
The exclusion of interested testimony was further attacked as
fundamentally inconsistent, for it barred the testimony only of
those with a pecuniary interest in the case, however small, while
allowing those with equal, or often greater (albeit indirect), interest in the case-e.g., relatives, friends, enemies-to be offered
as witnesses.' 8 The reformers argued that if the danger of perjury
249 (1825). Accord N.Y. COMMISsupra note 13, at 247. One American commentator, urging admission of the
sworn testimony of the parties in civil suits, went so far as to assert that "[t]he probability
is, that ninety-nine out of every one hundred plaintiffs and defendants would tell the truth
if put upon the witness stand." Of the Disqualificationof Partiesas Witnesses, 5 Am. L.
REG. 257, 262 (1857) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification].
1See, e.g., Disqualification,supranote 14, at 263-64.
18 LIVINCSTON, supra note 12, at 429. Lord Denman characterized the rationale of
the exclusion as an "[a]sk no questions, and you will hear no lies" attitude, one which he
equated with an attitude that "an entire abstinence from food" is the "only perfect security
against swallowing poison." 17 [London] Law Times 54 (1851).
17 LIVINGSTON, supranote 12, at 429. Ironically, the need for a general rule had been
one of the principal justifications for the exclusion. See, e.g., STARKUE ON EVIDENCE 83
(1824), quoted in 2 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 576, at 686-87:
There are, no doubt, many whom no interests could seduce from a sense of
duty, and their exclusion by the operation of this rule may in particular cases
shut out the truth. But the law must prescribe general rules; and experience
proves that more mischief would result from the general reception of interested witnesses than is occasioned by their general exclusion.
18 See, e.g., N.Y. COMMISSIONERS, supra note 13, at 247; 27 LAw MAc. 485 (1842).
Bentham's attack on this aspect of the rule conveys the flavor of his criticism generally:
14 j. BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JuDIcIAL EVIDENCE

SIONERS.
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was really as great as the opponents of reform maintained, the
common law rule hardly eliminated it.
The reformers did not discount entirely the risk of perjury;
rather, they argued that exclusion exaggerated the danger that
falsehood would escape detection.9 The jury would be aware of
the interest of the witness, and alert to any inconsistencies in his
account or suspiciousness in his demeanor. The interested witness' testimony would be meticulously compared with that of
other witnesses. Finally, the witness would be subject to searching cross-examination, "at once the most perfect and effectual
system for the unraveling of falsehood ever devised by the ingenuity of mortals."' 2
At any event, the reformers believed the gain from allowing
the testimony of interested witnesses clearly outweighed the possibility of harm, for only by hearing all relevant testimony could
the jury hope to arrive at an accurate verdict.21 As Livingston put
it, "Exclusion is, in many cases, a certain evil-admission is only
a problematical one."2
On the will of man, if you believe the English lawyer, one thing, and one
thing only, has influence: that thing is money.... If you will believe the
man of law, there is no such thing as the fear of God; no such thing as regard
for reputation; no such thing as fear of legal punishment; no such thing as
ambition; no such thing as the love of power; no such thing as filial, no such
thing as parental, affection; no such thing as party attachment; no such
thing as party enmity; no such thing as public spirit, patriotism, or general
benevolence; no such thing as compassion; no such thing as gratitude; no
such thing as revenge. Or (what comes to the same thing) weighed against
the interest produced by the value of a farthing, the utmost mass of interest
producible from the action of all those affections put together, vanishes in
the scale.... For a farthing-for the chance of gaining the incommensurable fraction of a farthing, no man upon earth, no Englishman at least, that
would not perjure himself. This in Westminster Hall is science: this in Westminster Hall is law.
J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JuDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827), quoted in 2 WIGMORE, supra note
1, § 576, at 688. Accord J. BENTHAM, supra note 14, at 249.

19 See, e.g., N.Y. COMMISSIONERS, supranote 13, at 247.
20 Disqualification,supra note 14, at 263-64. Accord LIVINGSTON, supra note 12, at
425-27.
21 Appleton, for example, argued that the "exclusion of evidence is the exclusion of
the means of correct decision." Appleton, Testimony of Defendants in CriminalProsecutions, 14 AM. L. REc. 705, 706 (1866).
2 LIVINGSTON, supranote 12, at 428. According to Sir James Stephen, even false testimony had value:
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These arguments applied to interested witnesses generally;
however, when it came to the parties of a lawsuit, special considerations tempered application of these arguments to the parties,
since their testimony seemed at once the most essential and yet
the most conducive to perjury.ss Thus, although Bentham had
advocated the immediate abolition of all the rules of incompetency, others who were more cautious preferred to take one step
at a time and assess the results before proceeding further.2 This
incremental approach, however, served not only the tactical
function of gradually eroding the resistance to change where a
frontal assault might have failed, but also provided the advocates
of further change with a ready arsenal of precedents.25
Of these precedents, Lord Denman's Act was the first which,
in 1843, allowed interested witnesses other than parties to testify
in both civil and criminal trials.2 Lord Denman's Act was followed in 1846 by the County Courts Bill,2 which removed the
incapacity of the parties to civil actions in the county courts
(which had a maximum jurisdictional amount of 50 pounds).
Then, in 1851, Lord Brougham proposed extending the grant of
competency to civil parties in the superior courts. In his address
to the House of Lords urging adoption of the bill, Brougham
stressed the major theme of the reformers that the exclusion of

This is founded on the principle that though it may be expected that particular classes of witnesses will not always tell the truth, yet their testimony
will have some sort of relation to it, from which it may be inferred what the
truth really is... In other words, evidence, whether true or false, is almost
always instructive, and ought therefore to be given in all cases for what it is
worth.
J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 284 (London 1863).
23 See, e.g., LIVINGSTON, supranote 12, at 438.
24 See, e.g., 116 PARL. DEB. (3d. ser.) 18-19 (1851) (Lord Campbell); LIVINGSTON,

supra note 12, at 441-42, 450-51; Thayer, A Chapterof Legal History in Massachusetts, 9
HARV. L. REv. 1, 11 (1895). Even Lord Denman was apparently hesitant at first to extend
the grant of competency to parties. See 117 PAL. DEB. (3d. ser.) 445 (1851) (Lord Campbell on Lord Denman's change of mind); 17 Law Times 53 (1851).
25 The effectiveness of this tactic was illustrated both in the extension of competency
to civil parties and, subsequently, to criminal defendants. See text accompanying notes 5153 and notes 147-48 infrafor examples of the effective use of this tactic.
2 An Act for Improving the Law and Evidence, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 85 (1843).
2
7 An Act for the More Easy Recovery of Small Debts and Demands in England, 9 &
10 Vict., c. 95 (1846).
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the parties' testimony "shut out the account of those who must
needs know more of the matter in dispute than all the rest of the
world," thereby leading in many instances "to the manifest failure of justice." He noted the many cases where a party, though
innocent, lost solely because of his inability to offer as evidence
his account of a transaction as to which he had no other witnesses. 29 With an unscrupulous opponent, the risk of a miscarriage of justice was even greater, since-as Bentham had observed-the honest party is "delivered without mercy into the
hands of a mendacious witness on the other side."' ' e Innocent defendants were particularly vulnerable, since plaintiffs might be
tempted to make false allegations where they knew there were no
other witnesses; furthermore, even where other witnesses
existed, a plaintiff might attempt to bar their testimony by joining them as defendants. '
In his address to Parliament, Lord Brougham attacked the
contention that the admission of the parties' testimony would increase the incidence of perjury in the courts; on the contrary, he
argued that the admission of such testimony would actually reduce the occurrence of perjury. The rationale of his argument
was comprised of, four components. First, the exclusion of the
parties did not prevent, and indeed encouraged, subornation of
perjury, which was both more likely to occur and more difficult
to detect than perjury by the parties themselves.32 Second, to the
28 116 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 9 (1851). Accord 118 PARI. DEB. (3d ser.) 839 (1851) (Attorney General's speech in the House of Commons supporting Lord Brougham's Act); Disqualification,supra note 14, at 263.
2 116 PA tL. DEB. (3d ser.) 9 (1851). One American commentator queried, "How
many a cause has been lost for the want of proof of a fact which lay in the knowledge of
one of the parties alonel" Disqualification,supra note 14, at 263.
30
j.BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDIcIAL EVIDENCE, quoted in 2 WIcMO.RE, supranote
1, § 577, at 694.
31 Id. See 116 PAHL. DEB. (3d ser.) 10 (1851) (Lord Brougham).
32 See 116 PAR.L DEB. (3d ser.) 4-5 (1851). Perjury was more likely to occur, according to Lord Brougham, because a person who might not think of lying to save himself
might be led to distort the truth to help a friend as the result of a misguided sense of loyalty. Moreover, the chance of detection was less than in the case of perjury by the party himself. See text accompanying note 33 infra for a discussion of the relative ease of detection of
perjury in the testimony of parties. Even should the witness' perjury be discovered, the deterrent effect was reduced by the lesser stigma associated with such "altruistic" perjury.
The fact that exclusion of the parties did nothing to prevent subornation of perjury

1981-82]

PARTY-WITNESS DISQUALIFICATION

extent that testimony by the parties displaced the reliance on tes-

timony by ordinary witnesses, it would contribute to the reduction of successful perjury, since the factfinder would be most
alert to and skeptical of the testimony of the party precisely because his interest was most obvious. 3 In addition, a party, in
contrast to an ordinary witness, must generally testify as to the
entire matter in dispute rather than merely a particular element
of the case. "The longer and the more minute a story is, the more
exposed is it to detection if groundless-the more materials does
it furnish for detection by cross-examination, by comparison of
its parts, by contrast with other evidence." 4 Finally, "the exclusion of the parties as witnesses... makes it necessary to examine
a number of other persons [and] [t]he chances of perjury are increased with the number of witnesses." ' '
Thus, the attack on the disqualification of parties was based
primarily on the unsoundness of the common law exclusion in
principle and the necessity of reform in the interests of discovering the truth and ensuring justice. However, the reformers had
other arguments as well, which arrayed themselves under two
general headings: consistency and judicial economy.
Stressing the inconsistencies resulting from the rule, the reformers identified numerous exceptions which had been grafted
onto the rule of exclusion under the common law where necessity
was thought to require it, but which had led to artificial and illogical distinctions which tainted the judicial process and made a
mockery of the supposed rationale for exclusion. 36 They noted
was frequently cited by the advocates of reform as an example of the rule's unsoundness.

See, e.g., 118 PAIL. DEB. (3d ser.) 841 (1851) (the Attorney General); Disqualification,
supra note 14, at 259.
33 See J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, quoted in 2 WIGMORE, supra
note 1, § 577, at 693-94; 118 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 841 (1851) (the Attorney General); 116
PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 4-5 (1851) (Lord Brougham).
34 116 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 5 (1851) (Lord Brougham).
35 Id.
36 For a catalogue of these exceptions, see Disqualification,supra note 14, at 259-61.

Cf. LIVINGSTON, supra note 12, at 431-36 (exceptions in application of rule barring interested witnesses generally).
An example of the extent to which the elaborate common law rules surrounding
party exclusion exalted formalism over substance was given by the Law Times during its
campaign for the adoption of Lord Brougham's Bill:
In an action for seduction, the daughter, who is the real plaintiff, and the

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 70

also the inconsistent treatment of civil and criminal cases inasmuch as the prosecutor, though not the defendant, was allowed
to testify under oath in criminal cases. 37 In England, the reformers emphasized that while the testimony of the parties was
excluded in the superior common law courts where it could be
tested by cross-examination and was subject to the searching
scrutiny of judge and jury, it was in fact allowed in other judicial
settings where those safeguards were lacking-"precisely in those
[settings which were] the most exposed to the risk of false swearing."38

Those proceedings where the parties' testimony was allowed
included, first, non-jury cases tried before judges alone. In such
cases, the outcome was determined on the basis of sworn affidavits, including those of the parties. Unlike testimony in open
court, these affidavits were prepared and sworn in private, with
the leisure necessary to state the most favorable version of the
facts and in the knowledge that they would be subject neither to
cross-examination nor to the watchful eye of the judge and jury.39
Second, the sworn testimony of the parties was allowed in proceedings in chancery, another arena in which the safeguards of

party having the deepest interest in the verdict, is admitted as a witness,
while the father, who has but a secondary interest in it, is excluded. The defendant is also excluded, so that the tribunal... actually hears the interested party on one side only, and refuses to hear the statement of the other

party. And this is the system of impartial justice which some unreflecting
persons are so desirous of maintainingl
17 Law Times 38 (1851). This situation was described as a "striking instance of absurdity."
Id.
37 See 118 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 841 (1851) (the Attorney General); 116 PAa... DEB.
(3d ser.) 8 (1851) (Lord Brougham); Disqualification, supra note 14, at 260-61. The
reason for this was the fact that it was the government and not the complainant who was
the nominal party. Lord Brougham argued (somewhat speculatively) that the effect of this
arrangement was actually to increase the level of perjury in the courts. A plaintiff, frustrated in his civil suit by his inability to get his story before the court, might be led to ini-

tiate a criminal action against his adversary, where his testimony would be admissible

"under all the influence of those feelings [frustration at losing the civil suit]; and as now his

adversary's mouth is closed, at least before the jury, the compensation in damages having
been denied, he is compensated by the gratification of revenge, which he may find the
sweeter of the two." 116 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 9 (1851).
38 116 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 6 (1851) (Lord Brougham).

39 118 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 841 (1851) (the Attorney General); 116 PARL. DEB. (3d
ser.) 6-7 (1851).
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an open trial were lacking. 40 While this testimony was limited to
answers prepared in response to the opposing party's bill of dis-

covery, so that neither party could voluntarily initiate submission
of his testimony, Lord Brougham maintained that the risk of perjury was equally present. 41 Thus, asserted Brougham:
[Y]ou do examine the parties to every suit in Equity, and you
do expose yourselves to this risk of perjury incalculably more
because your examination of each party is conducted behind
the back of the other-under the advice of professional menwithout the risk of exposure to the adversary, and without ihe
42
control of the Judge.

To defend the admission of party testimony in chancery and yet
to resist its admission in the common law courts, where "all the
tests of truth are applied to [it]" was, the Law Times suggested,
"to strain at the gnat and swallow the camel."'4 Finally, the English reformers observed that since the passage of the County
Courts Bill, the common law had two different systems of procedure, basing admission of a party's testimony on whether the
amount in controversy was more or less than 50 pounds, a dis44
tinction which the reformers attacked as absurd.
40

Indeed, Lord Brougham noted that so conscious was Chancery of the inadequacy
of its factfinding procedure that it directed issues to the common law courts for resolution.
116 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 8 (1851). This created yet another inconsistency in the application
of the exclusionary rules since in these instances Chancery often directed that the parties
be examined.
41
Id. (Lord Brougham).
42
Id. The Law Times added:
In [Chancery, the party] is subjected only to an examination in private, by
questions previously prepared, and, therefore, impossible to be adapted to
circumstances as they may arise in the course of the inquiry, and with ample
time and opportunity to frame answers which, if not positively false, may be
a suppression of the truth. If it be unsafe to receive the testimony of parties
to a suit, it would be impossible to conceive a method of taking it more likely
to render it worthless and to encourage perjury.
17 Law Times 53 (1851). Accord 118 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 841 (1851) (the Attorney General). 43 17 Law Times 53 (1851).
44 116 PAnL. DEB. (3d ser.) 13 (1851) (Lord Brougham); id. at 19 (Lord Campbell).
Lord Brougham rejected the suggestion that, because the amount at stake was greater, the
risk of perjury was higher in the superior courts. He argued that since the parties in county
court tended to be poorer than those in the superior courts, the relative importance to .
them of the amount at stake was the same-"the little sum is great to little men." Id. at 13-
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Under the heading of judicial economy, the reformers, both
English and American, stressed the delay and expense which the
common law exclusion created, both because it denied to the
trier of fact the most efficient source of evidence, thus requiring
the production of more witnesses, and because it engendered
complexity as a consequence of the numerous exceptions to the
rule. 45 A further source of delay and expense was the occasional
practice whereby a party would file a bill of discovery in chancery, as the only way to obtain the examination of his adversary,
thus forcing the parties "to go from a court of law to a court of
equity, and then come back to a court of law." 46 Finally, it was
suggested that the common law rule encouraged frivolous suits
and that reform would result in a decrease in vexatious litigation:
"How many plaintiffs persist in their attack, how many defendants persevere in their resistance, merely because each knows
that the other's mouth is closed?"

4

7

To these high-minded objects was added an appeal to the
self-interest of the legal community. The exclusion of party testimony in England was held responsible for a marked shift in litigation from the superior to the county courts. 48 Arguing that the
14. Indeed, he argued that, if anything, the risk of perjury was less in the superior courts:
"The parties are likely to be of a higher station, and more under the influence of honourable feelings. The presence of the Judges is more awful. The concourse of the public is
more thronged." Id. at 14.
The experience under the County Courts Act, like that under Lord Denman's Act,
was also valuable to the reformers as evidence that the fears of the opponents, who had
made the same arguments against both of these measures, were groundless. See text accompanying note 51 infra for a discussion of this point.
46 See, e.g., 116 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 10 (1851) (Lord Brougham); N.Y. CoMimsSIONERS, supra note 13, at 247; Disqualification,supra note 14, at 264; 17 Law Times 98,
106(1851).
46 116 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 19 (1851) (Lord Campbell). Accord N.Y. COMMISSIONERS,
supra note 13, at 244. Lord Campbell considered this to be simply a symptom of a larger
problem. It was, he said,
part of the same system, which was a disgrace to this country, by which parties first went to a court of equity, were then sent back to a court of law, and
were then sent back to a court of equity, and years rolled on, and their fortunes were ruined, before they could get a decision upon their suits.
116 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 19 (1851).
47 116 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 10 (1851) (Lord Brougham).
48 Lord Denman observed that the "public decidedly prefers the County Courts to
the Common Law Courts" to the extent that "the former tribunals swarm with suitors,
while the latter are almost deserted." 17 Law Times 106 (1851). He attributed this to the
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"salvation of the Superior Courts depends upon the speedy passing" of Lord Brougham's Act, the reformers urged that the continued loss of business to the county courts could lead to the "des4
titution of the Bar" and "the ruin of many now in business." 1
The opposition to Lord Brougham's Bill resulted from two
major factors: the continued fear of perjury, and the inertia of
the legal profession. Although the bill ultimately passed both
Houses of Parliament by wide margins, it faced considerable opposition from the organized bar, the common law judges and, in
the House of Lords, from the Lord Chancellor. ° The response of
the reformers to the fear of perjury on the merits has already
been discussed. Moreover, they dismissed the suggestion that the
Act proposed an untested innovation, citing the experience under
the County Court Act 5' and pointing out that the testimony of

fact that the county courts were "cheap and efficient," whereas the common law courts
followed a "dilatory, expensive course of procedure," in which the prime villain was the
testimonial disqualification of the parties. Id. But see 17 Law Times 121 (1851) (suggesting that the extent of the shift was exaggerated).
49 17 Law Times 106 (1851). The Law Times lamented that "business is still declining, as every pleader's chambers and every agent's office knows but too well" and expressed dismayed astonishment that, "[sleemingly unconscious that the future prosperity
of the Superior Courts is dependent on the success of [Lord Brougham's Act], the Law Institute petitioned the House of Lords againstitll" 17 Law Times 121 (1851).
50 "[Lord Brougham's Act] created great opposition, and Lord Campbell writes of it
in his journal as follows: 'Lord Brougham's Bill is opposed, as might be expected, by the
Lord Chancellor. If it passes, it will create a new era of administration of Justice in this
Country. I support it and I think it will be carried, although all the Common Law Judges,
with one exception, are hostile to it."' H. POLAND, SEVENTY-Two YEARS AT THE BAn 27
(1924), quoted in 2 WcMoRE, supra note 1, § 576, at 692. The extent of the opposition is
indicated in 17 Law Times 38, 54, 157 (1851). For evidence of the Lord Chancellor's opposition, which was based on his fear that admission of the parties would greatly increase
the level of perjury in the courts, see 116 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 16 (1851) (Lord Truro, the
Lord Chancellor); 1 J. ATLAY, THE VicronIAN CHANCELLORs 452 (1906).
The fact that the Chancellor, whose own court relied on the testimony of the parties (albeit limited to admissions) as a staple of its discovery procedure, was a leader of the
opposition to Lord Brougham's Act was an irony not lost on the advocates of reform. The
Law Times observed that "[t]he practice and the preaching of the noble lord are altogether at variance. If that testimony is but one-half as dangerous as he represents it, he has
no right to place any reliance upon it for the formation of his own judgments." 17 Law
Times 53 (1851).
51The reports of the county court judges, stating their satisfaction at the new procedure, were frequently cited by the reformers. See, e.g., 118 PAIL. DEB. (3d ser.) 842 (1851)
(the Attorney General); 116 PAnL. DEB. (3d ser.) 11-13 (1851) (Lord Brougham); 17 Law
Times 54 (1851).
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the parties was in fact already permitted, to one degree or
another, in all courts other than the superior common law
courts. 52 The reformers attacked the overly cautious resistance to
change by the legal profession, noting that the same arguments
had been advanced from the same quarters on the occasion of
Lord Denman's Act, "[b]ut, happily for society, the Legislature
took a more enlightened view of the question than did the lawyers," with the result that the Act "has been found in practice not
to produce one of the evils predicted of it, while it has vastly facilitated that which is, or ought to be, the object of all evidence,
the ascertainment of the truth." 53 A further attempt to counter
the resistance of the Bar was the appeal to its self-interest previously discussed. In the debate in the House of Lords over Lord Brougham's
Act, the Chancellor made one further, somewhat curious, argument against the reform. He suggested that the existing system,
whereby the parties spoke only through their counsel, at -least
achieved a rough equality between opposing parties, whereas the
grant of competency would cause the outcome of a lawsuit to
turn largely on the accident of the relative skill and persuasiveness of the parties, giving an advantage to those of higher intelligence and pleasing demeanor.s Lord Brougham rejected this argument, noting that precisely the same objection could be made
to allowing the testimony of any witness at all.56 The Law Times,
The Law Times observed:
To read the illogical speech of the Lord Chancellor, and the petition of the
Incorporated Law Society, it might be supposed that some great innovation
was contemplated, which was to reverse all previous experience and substitute a new and questionable practice, entirely strange to the law and customs of English courts of justice. Now, would not a stranger perusing these
protests be amazed to be told, as the truth is, that in five out of these six
classes of tribunals [i.e., the Equity Courts, the Ecclesiastical Courts, the
Criminal Courts, the County Courts, and the Magistrates" Courts (the Common Law Courts being the sixth)] the practice already exists, and has existed
for centuries, at least with so much content to judges and suitors that not one
of them has ever so much as proposed to change it?
17 Law Times 53 (1851).
3 Id. at 38. Accord 118 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 840 (1851) (the Attorney General).
54 See the text accompanying notes 48-49 supra for a discussion of this appeal to the
Bar's self-interest.
556 116 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 17 (1851).
' Id. at 15.
52
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a strong advocate of reform, advanced a related point, suggesting
that too many members of the Bar were inclined to view a trial as
a contest of skill between counsel rather than as an attempt to elicit the truth, a view which had led them to minimize the importance of testimony by the parties themselves.57
In the United States, the debate followed a similar pattern,
with the substantial difference that American reformers were
aided by the precedent set in England. s Reflecting in 1895 on the
course of reform in the United States over the previous decades,
Thayer wrote: "It was the English example that moved us." 59
The American experience differed from the English in a significant respect, however: the residual opposition to competency
manifested itself in the form of Dead Man Statutes, which were
enacted throughout the country at roughly the same time, and
often as part of the same statute, as the general grant of competency.60 The prevalence of thig exception illustrated the extent to
which the fear of perjury continued to be a concern of American
legislators.
III. REFORM iNCRIMINAL TRIALS
The statutory grants of competency to the parties which began with Lord Brougham's Act 6' and quickly spread throughout
the United States had one common thread: they expressly excluded the accused in a criminal trial. In contrast to the pattern
of reform relating to interested witnesses and civil parties, where
England had led the way, the removal of the incapacity of the
criminal accused began in the United States. In 1864, Maine became the first common law jurisdiction to allow the criminal de-

57 17 Law Times 38 (1851). "
58 See, e.g., N.Y. CoMMIssIoNEns, supra note 13; Thayer, supranote 24, at 11 (quotig the Massachusetts Commission's statement in its 1851 report to the Legislature recommending the abolition of the disqualification of interested non-party witnesses: "We have
been a good deal influenced by the course of legislation in England.").
59 Thayer, supra note 24, at 12. Thayer also credited the "powerful influence of

Bentham." Id.
60 These statutes are catalogued at 2 WicMoBE, supra note 1, § 488, and discussed at

id. § 578.

61 An Act to Amend the Law of Evidence, 14 & 15 Viet., c. 99 (1851).
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fendant to elect to give sworn testimony at his trial.62 Other states
soon followed, and by 1900 only Georgia retained the common
law disqualification.63 Yet it was not until 1898, with the passage
of the Criminal Evidence Act,1 that England adopted this seemingly logical extension of Lord Brougham's Act.
That a short time lag should have occurred between the
grant of competency in civil and in criminal trials is not surprising: the objections to competency seemed to apply with particular force to criminal defendants, and a short delay is consistent
with the pattern of incremental reform that has been noted.
What does seem puzzling, however, at least at first glance, is the
length of the delay which occurred in England. In part, this
anomaly is more apparent than real; in part, however, it reflects
62 See 2 Wir-moPE, supra note 1, § 579, at 701. The Maine statute was the work of

Chief Justice Appleton of the Maine Supreme Court, a disciple of Bentham.
r3 Georgia did not finally render the accused competent to testify until 1962, in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570. Georgia,
while it denied the defendant in a criminal trial the right to testify under oath, did permit
him to make an unswom statement, which was not subject to cross-examination. The trial
court in Fergusonhad refused to allow defendant's counsel to ask him any questions during his unsworn statement. The Supreme Court held that to do so was a denial of the defendant's constitutional right to counsel. While the Court ruled that the constitutionality
of the incompetency provision itself was not properly before the Court, Justice Brennan's
opinion, which contained a lengthy history of the incompetency rule, left little doubt that,
in a proper case, it too would be held invalid. Indeed, the concurring opinions, arguing
that the incompetency and unsworn statement provisions were both part of a unified statutory scheme, urged that the Court should invalidate the entire package. See 365 U.S. at
598, 601 (Frankfurter, J., and Clark, J., concurring).
The reason for Georgia's anomalous adherence to the incompetency of the accused
is unclear. In 1968, a Governor's Commission, reviewing the history of the rule, gave as its
rationale "the common law idea that it was not humanly possible to speak the truth when
testifying on one's behalf." [GEORGIA] GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE,

REPORT 102 (1968). The issue apparently remained controversial until the end. In 1957,
the Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure of the Georgia Bar Association recommended against removing the incompetency of the accused, arguing that "such a change
in our criminal procedure would aid the prosecution and conviction of the defendant and
would be of no material benefit to any defendant." REPORT OF THE 74TH ANNUAL SESSION
OF THE GEORGIA BAR ASSOCIATION 182-83 (1957). Three years later, however, the same

committee reversed itself on the grounds that "the experienced criminal can make a more
convincing argument now in his own unsworn statement to the jury, whereas the innocent
or inexperienced defendant will do himself irreparable harm in many instances by making
a statement without the privilege of either direct or cross-examination." REPORT OF THE
77TH SESSION OF THE GEORGIA BAR ASSOCIATION 115 (1960).

64 An Act to Amend the Law of Evidence: Evidence in Criminal Cases Bill, 61 & 62
Vict., c. 36 (1898).
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a substantial institutional resistance to what was viewed as a fundamental change in criminal procedure.65 As will be developed
further, the considerations involved in the grant of competency
to the criminal accused were substantially more complex than
those implicated in the earlier reforms.
The prevailing view among modern commentators has been
that the delay in extending competency to criminal trials was due
primarily to a concern with the effect such a change would have
on innocent defendants, and in particular the tension it would
create with the accused's privilege against self-incrimination.6
This explanation is not so much inaccurate as it is an oversimplification. First, it discounts the significance of the continued fear
of perjury as a source of opposition to reform. Second, by focusing on the plight of the accused, it obscures the extent to which
the opponents of change were concerned with the effect of reform not on the defendant but on the character of the judicial
process.
Despite the tendency of modern commentators to deemphasize perjury as a factor in the debate over the extension of competency to the accused, it is clear that the continued fear of perjury
played a major role. Indeed, it would be surprising if the concern
which had been the leading source of opposition to the competency of civil parties should suddenly vanish during consideration
of the competency of criminal defendants. The danger of perjury
seemed particularly acute in the case of the accused, since the
stakes and hence the temptation to falsehood were greater for
him than for the ordinary civil party. In addition, many shared
the view of one contemporary that the danger of perjury was enhanced by "the ignorance and low state of morality of the criminal classes." As one treatise writer explained: "With regard to
the competency of parties defending in criminal prosecutions, it
is scarcely necessary to observe, that as they are generally most
strongly interested in the event, it seldom happens that they can

65 See the text accompanying notes 153-66 infra for a discussion of the causes of delay
in England.
6 See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. at 578; 2 WICMORE, supra note 1, § 579, at
703.
67 106 Law Times 111 (1898) (letter).
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be called as witnesses."68 One opponent of the Criminal Evidence
Act in Parliament described the Act as "a Bill for the manufacture of perjury."6 Another referred to the danger that the Act
would give an "unfair advantage to the skilled liar, the self-confident, plausible scoundrel;"7 while a third argued that the result
of the proposed reform would be that "one criminal cleverer than
71
another will manage by deliberate perjury to escape his doom."
Furthermore, a noted English judge opined:
If one could suppose that every man called as a witness on his
own behalf would speak the truth the Act would be a most admirable provision. But he could not help thinking as time went
on, when the privilege was often made use of, sometimes both
judges and juries would be shocked at the amount of perjury
that
which would be committed. It was impossible to suppose
72
all persons placed in difficulty would speak the truth.
The importance of the perjury issue is also demonstrated by
the arguments of the supporters of extending competency to the
accused. They devoted considerable space to the refutation of the
danger of perjury, using the same arguments which had served
them in the battle over civil parties.73 However, these arguments
only partially answered the concerns of the opponents regarding
criminal defendants: the opponents were worried not only that
falsehood would go undetected and thus taint the jury's verdict,
but they were also concerned about a system which, as they saw
it, had the inevitable effect of leading the accused into commit68 PHILLIPPS ON EVIDENCE 52 (5th Am. ed. 1868).
69 60 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 317 (1898).
70 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1068 (1898).

71 60 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 319 (1898).
72 106 Law Times 13 (1898) (Justice Hawkins).
73 See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 21, at 708-10; Pitt-Lewis, The New GreatReform
in the CriminalLaw, 44 NINETEENTH CENTURY 591, 595-96 (1898).
The concern over the risk of perjury also manifested itself in the discussion as to
where in the order the defendant should testify. One English judicial officer remarked
that "he thought it most inexpedient that the prisoner should first hear the evidence of his
witnesses and then get into the box and back them up on oath." 105 Law Times 581 (1898)
(statement of Sir Forest Fulton, Common Serjeant). Wigmore notes that in the United
States, particularly in the South, the competency statutes sometimes contained the "proviso that the accused should testify, if at all, first in order of the witnesses on his own side."
2 WICMORE.supra note 1, § 579, at 701.
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ting perjury. Indeed, it was almost worse if the falsehood was de-

tected, for then the defendant could be prosecuted for perjury in
addition to the crime for which he was already on trial. Implicit
in this view was the belief that the commission of perjury under
these circumstances was not especially blameworthy; rather, it
was simply the natural consequence of a system which placed an
irresistible temptation before the accused and then punished him
when he responded to it. 74 Even an innocent defendant could be
tempted into distortion or tricked into technical perjury on crossexamination. 75 But guilt or innocence was not the point-even
the guilty were entitled to avoid being lured into compounding
their crimes by the crime of perjury. The danger of entrapment
seemed even greater because of the view that many of the opponents of reform seemed to have of the majority of defendants: ignorant, easily confused, and often of generally bad character,
even if innocent of the particular crime charged. In short, these
persons were perceived as particularly vulnerable to entrapment. 76
The distinction which this view drew between the danger of
falsehood, with its potential for misleading the court, and that of
the specific offense of perjury, with its consequences for the accused, is illustrated by the following statement by a Parliamentary opponent of the Act:

74 As one Parliamentary critic of the Act said: "What an awful temptation you hold
out to this unfortunate man to perjure himself! To his crime, asuming that he is guilty, you
add the crime of perjury. You expose him to a temptation which the average, the ordinary
man, would be unable to resist." 56 PxaL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1059 (1898). See J. STEPHEN,
supra note 22, at 202.
It was not simply that competency created an unfair temptation to perjury; the
opponents of reform argued that, because of the unfavorable inference which the jury
would draw from the failure to testify, the accused was practicallyforced to take thestand
and, if guilty, lie to save himself. See note 146 infra for a discussion of this coercion to testify.
One Parliamentary opponent concluded that the "habitual spectacle of this
wholesale perjury" was "such an appalling result that he thought no legislation should be
passed on it," and added that "he could not see anything tending more to the demoralization of the country" than a bill which encouraged such a prospect. 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.)
1064-65 (1898).
75 See, e.g., 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 990 (1898).
76 See notes 87-90 infra and accompanying text

nerability.

for observations regarding this vul-
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[T]here is another great defect in this Bill, and that is the opening of the door to perjury upon a gigantic scale. Every prisoner
will think it his duty to go into the witness box and deny the
crime. He does so now, but not on oath. . . .I do not quite understand how the Attorney General is going to get over that
difficulty. He is going to invite, under this Bill, 82 per cent of
the prisoners charged with various kinds of offense [those who
were guilty] to commit wilful and corrupt perjury.77
A more extreme manifestation of this attitude took the form of an
amendment to the Criminal Cases Bill (what became the Criminal Evidence Act) proposed in the House of Commons and providing that "[n]o person giving evidence under this Act shall be
liable to a prosecution for perjury." 8 The Solicitor General's reply illustrated that he held a more traditional view of the nature
of the perjury problem: "I really cannot take the honourable
Member quite seriously. We have heard complaints about encouraging perjury, but it seems to me that this would be a direct
incitement to perjury."79 The amendment was rejected.
There is obviously some tension between the view that perjury was harmful because by escaping detection it would aid the
guilty to go free, and the view that it was harmful because, by
being detected, it would subject the accused to prosecution for
perjury; yet both themes were present in the arguments of the
opponents of reform. This peculiar dimension of the perjury concern illustrates the mistake in equating the concern over perjury
with hostility towards the accused. On the contrary, one repeatedly finds assertions of the injurious effect which competency
would have on the position of the accused accompanying expressions of alarm at the danger of increased perjury. Sir Herbert
77

56 PARL.

DEB.

(4th ser.) 1037 (1898) (emphasis added). See Stephen, A Bill to Pro-

mote the Conviction of Innocent Prisoners,39 NINETEENTH CENTURY 566 (1896). Stephen,
who favored the practice of allowing the accused to make an unsworn statement, opposed
rendering him fully competent: "One objection to putting a prisoner on oath is that it adds
absolutely nothing to the value of what he may say. Another is... it amounts to encouragement of perjury." Id. at 572-73. In other words, only falsehood under oath was "perjury," even though the more usual view of the danger of perjury-that the factfinder
would be deceived-would lead to the conclusion that falsehood contained in the unsworn
statement posed the greater problem, since it was less likely to be detected.
78 62 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 747 (1898).
79 Id. at 748.
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Stephen, a vocal opponent of the Act whose primary objection
was summed up in the title of his article, "A Bill to Promote the
Conviction of Innocent Prisoners," expressed his belief that the
Bill "amounts to an encouragement of perjury.. . [;] [t]he great
majority of prisoners are guilty, and making them witnesses is
practically making them perjurers." ' Moreover, the same member of Parliament who described the Act as "a Bill for the manufacture of perjury" labeled it as "cruel" and, "from the point of
view of the prisoner ... [,] a great invasion of the rights which
the law of England has been so jealous to guard."81 At first
glance, this argument may seem paradoxical; however, it was
consistent with the two-pronged nature of the opponents' attack:
that the Act would at the same time hurt the innocent and (perhaps) help the guilty, while the object of the law should be precisely the opposite.8 2 Moreover, it was consistent with the view
that, even in the case of the guilty, the law should not be designed to entrap a defendant into perjury.
While the continuing importance of the concern over perjury
should therefore be emphasized, it cannot be denied that, at the
same time, a major theme of the opponents of competency was
its adverse impact on the accused. In this regard, the distinction
between defendants who were innocent and those who were
guilty is important. With respect to innocent defendants at least,
there was no disagreement as to the goal; the disagreement resulted because both the supporters and critics of reform asserted
that their position would best protect the innocent.83 In his
speech to the House of Commons in support of the Criminal
Cases Bill, the Attorney General insisted that the principal object
of the Bill was to ensure that innocent defendants were not convicted because of their inability to testify on their own behalf. 84
80 Stephen, supra note 77, at 573. Stephen was the son of Sir James Stephen, the

noted criminal law author.
81 60 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 317 (1898).
82 While the opportunity to testify might allow a few persuasive liars to escape, it

was also perceived as making the detection of guilty defendants easier. See text accompanying notes 140-44 infra for arguments relating to the easier detection of guilty defendants.
83 See notes 140-46 infra and the accompanying text for a further discussion of the

guilty defendants as to whom there was no such unanimity of purpose.
84 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 979-82, 985 (1898).
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Although there were those among the opponents who called this
a disingenuous pretense and asserted that the real purpose of the
Bill was to make convictions easier to secure,85 the more moderate critics conceded the sincerity of the supporters and argued
simply that they were misguided. These critics contended that
the average defendant, when put on the stand, would appear
hesitant and inarticulate and that under the pressure of crossexamination he could easily become confused and tricked into an
inconsistency or distortion which could make him appear guilty.
An innocent man, called upon to defend himself, would be overwhelmed by the solemnity of the proceeding and the severity of
the charges against him. Under these circumstances, asked one
critic, "How can you expect to find that clearness of intellect and
accuracy of memory which is so necessary to constitute a good
witness, even in one's own case?"86 The attitude of many of the
critics of reform, especially in England, was, to be sure, somewhat patronizing. In their view the reformers' approach to the issue represented too much the point of view of educated men,
who might well be benefited by the opportunity to testify,
whereas the majority of defendants were poor, ignorant, and
easily confused, and thus could only be hurt by testifying. 87 This
class consciousness was explicit in the argument that the Bill
would impact most heavily on the honest, laboring poor-"a picture of incoherent inarticulate innocence." Others had a less romantic view of the working poor, or at least of that subsection
which found itself in the dock: "I do not think I overstate it when
I say that 90 per cent of the persons charged in England are persons of more or less depraved character."89 Under this view, the
85 See, e.g., id. at 1050, 1079.

86 Id. at 1060. Accord id. at 1052-54.

87 See, e.g., id. at 1009-10, 1077.
88 Id. at 1068. Another Parliamentary opponent stated: "I only wish to say that I am
certain there are thousands and tens of thousands of the poorer classes of this country who

may be plunged into great difficulty" by the Act. 60 PAL. DEB. (4th ser.) 338 (1898). Accord id. at 445; 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 989 (1898).
These class-oriented arguments were highlighted by the fact that it was a Conservative government which was proposing the Bill, as well as by the fact that it had been the
House of Lords which had been the driving force behind the reform in Parliament over the
previous several decades.
89 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1036 (1898).
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average defendant, even if innocent of the particular crime
charged, probably did not have a completely clean record, a fact
which, if exposed on cross-examination, could work to his detriment.90
Thus, many opponents shared the view of the Vermont Supreme Court that "[i]n the great body of cases no wise practitioner would permit his client, whether he believed him guilty or
innocent, to testify when upon trial in a criminal case."' 91 According to Herbert Stephen, the defendant actually benefited from
his enforced silence, since nothing he could possibly say on the
stand would be as powerful as the "plain, total and explicit denial" of every particular of the charge that the jury was naturally
inclined to attribute to him:12 "This assumed denial is necessarily
free from the danger of being shaken in cross-examination, or
weakened by any defects there might be in the prisoner's way of
giving it .... ."93 By taking the stand, wrote Stephen, the defendant transformed himself into an ordinary witness, and "the sort
of sanctity which I have described as hedging him about disappears entirely." Thus, "[t]he whole class of prisoners whose
guilt is probable, but not so strongly probable as to make a jury
feel substantially sure of it, is acquitted if they cannot give evidence, and convicted if they can."95
The contention that innocent defendants were more likely to
be hurt by taking the stand was countered by the reformers' argument that competency only provided the accused an option
that he did not previously have and in no way compelled him to
take the stand. Indeed, the statutes expressly provided that the
defendant would be a competent but not compellable witness. 96
The opponents, however, contended that this choice was illusory
since "although they profess to leave it to the accused to become a
90 See, e.g., 60 PAtL. DEB. (4th ser.) 319, 555 (1898); 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1001,
1036 (1898).
91 State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555, 565-66 (1868). Accord Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y.
213, 221-22 (1871) ("Discreet counsel will hesitate before advising a client.., to be a
witness for himself.").
92 Stephen, supra note 77, at 569.
93 Id.

9 Id. at 570.
95 Id.
96
See 2 WIcMoHE, supra note 1, § 488, at 525-82.
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witness or not, [the competency statutes], in reality, force him to

take the stand to protect himself from the inference of guilt
which is almost sure to be drawn against him if he fails to do
so. 97 Thus, the critics claimed, the effect was not only to place
the accused in a cruel dilemma, but also to subvert two hallowed
maxims of the criminal law. First, they contended that allowing
the defendant to testify would shift the burden of proof from the
government to the defendant.98 So long as the defendant was incompetent, he was in effect requiring the prosecution to prove its
case without his assistance.9 9 Once he was rendered competent,

however, the prosecution could rely, at least in part, either on
discrediting him if he chose to take the stand or on the inevitable
inference of guilt if he did not. This, asserted Herbert Stephen,

ran contrary to the principle that "it is for those who affirm guilt
to prove it, and that, in fairness and justice, they should have to
do so without, in substance, calling upon the accused to contribute, by his own weakness, to his own destruction."100 One Parlia-

mentary opponent put it succinctly: "My simple lay view is this:
for centuries the criminal law of England has been administered
on the principle that if you want to hang a man you must hang
him on somebody else's evidence. This is a Bill to hang a man on
his own evidence ...

"101

97 Maury, Validity of Statutes Authorizing the Accused to Testify, 14 AM. L. REv.
753, 762-63 (1880).
98 See, e.g., 60 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 549 (1898) (effect will be to "throw the onus of

proof on the prisoner instead of on the prosecution").
99 See 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1001 (1898).
100 Stephen, supra note 77, at 575.
101 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1030 (1898), quoted in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. at
579 n.9. The critics argued that the proponents of reform were insensitive to the burden of
proof issue. While this was certainly not true of all of the reformers, see, e.g., 56 PARL.
DEB. (4th ser.) 983 (1898) Attorney General), there is support for this claim in the statements of at least some of the advocates of competency. One American commentator, for
example, asserting the unfairness of the exclusion of the sworn testimony of the accused,
wrote: "The law demands of us to prove our innocence, but shuts our mouths when we essay to try." Testimony of Partiesin CriminalProceedings,14 AM. L. REG. 129, 133 (1866)
(unsigned article) [hereinafter cited as Testimony of Parties].As a statement of the burden
of proof in criminal cases, this assertion is of course incorrect.
The opponents of competency further argued that the reformers' reference to the
practice in civil trials as a reason for extending competency to criminal proceedings ignored the difference in the burden of proof in the two situations. See note 147 infra and
the accompanying text for a further ciscussion of this point.
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Second, the opponents of reform argued that the competency
of the accused would undercut the privilege against self-incrimination. This assertion rested on two critical assumptions: first,
that the grant of competency, although elective in form, was in
reality coercive because of the unfavorable inference that would
be drawn from the failure to testify; and, second, that the majority of defendants, including those who were innocent, would not
voluntarily take the stand if properly advised. For this reason,
some commentators went so far as to argue, at least in the United
States, that statutes conferring competency on the accused were
unconstitutional under the fifth amendment to the Constitution. 02 Others maintained that constitutionality was preserved
only by the proviso, either included in the statute or judicially
imposed, forbidding any comment to be made or inference to be
drawn from the defendant's failure to testify. 03
A further argument was less plausible-that the protection of
the privilege against self-incrimination was in fact the historical
basis of the common law incompetency of the accused. This
view, developed in an article in the American Law Review, 104
started from the premise that "[t]he common law enjoys a preeminence over all other systems of jurisprudence in the jealousy with
which it guards personal liberty," and that "it prefers to see ninety and nine guilty men go unpunished.., rather than that the
safety of one innocent man should be sacrificed."' 105 The author
contended that the incompetency of the accused was originally
conceived as a necessary corollary of the privilege against selfincrimination, reasoning that it was "part and parcel of the prohibition against compulsory self-accusation that the accused
shall not be permitted to waive the privilege, thus placing it on
the lofty ground of the other safeguards of liberty. . . which the

The reformers, however, suggested that the incompetency of the accused itself
distorted the allocation of the burden of proof, by undermining the presumption of innocence.102
See note 128 infra for one commentator's view of this distortion.
See Maury, supra note 97, at 762. This view did not prevail. On the contrary, the
Supreme Court has held that it would be unconstitutional not to allow the defendant to be
sworn. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975).
103 See Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. at 222; Staples v. State, 89 Tenn. 231,233 (1898).
104 Maury, supranote 97.
10 5 Id. at 761.
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law, in its tenderness, does not permit an accused to waive."'106 It
was only the "incuriousness of the age touching the history and
spirit of the organic principles on which our institutions rest [that

had] permitted unwise innovators to overthrow [by means of the
competency statutes] the barrier which protected accused parties
from compulsory examinations in their own cases." ' ° ,
Whatever may have been the merits of the claim that allowing the accused to testify would infringe on his privilege against
self-incrimination, the attempt to read that concern back into the
origins of the incompetency rule is highly problematic. In the
first place, the rule of incompetency seems to antedate the appearance of the privilege against self-incrimination in common
law criminal procedure. °8 The most questionable aspect of this
approach, however, is its premise that the dominant attitude of
English criminal law in the period in question-the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries-was one of "tenderness" towards
the accused and that the theory upon which the criminal justice
system rested was that it was better to let ninety-nine guilty men
go free than to convict a single innocent one. Rather, at the beginning of this period the accused was not even allowed to have
witnesses sworn on his behalf; until the end of it he was not en-

titled to the full use of counsel in felony trials; and throughout
most of it he was subjected to vigorous questioning, although not
under oath, by the judge, if not by the prosecutor. "IThroughout
most of this period the accused was subject to punishment by
death for relatively minor offenses. Moreover, until the advent of
a professional police force in the mid-nineteenth century, the
criminal law relied on a whole range of private incentives for the
effective detection and punishment of crime. These devicespardons to accomplices in return for their testimony, statutory
and private rewards, common informers, Tyburn Tickets, and
the like-were accepted as necessary evils in the fight against
crime despite the obvious abuses to which they were prone-'06 Id. at 766-67.
107 Id. at 769.
108 See Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 263,
283 (1978).
109For a discussion of criminal procedure during this period, see Langbein, supra
note 108.
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most notably the invitation to perjury and false accusation, dramatically illustrated by the notorious "blood-money" conspiracies." 0 Indeed, the prevailing view would seem to have been that
it was better that a few innocent persons suffer than that the
mass of guilty individuals escape the law. Whatever else may be
said about the privilege against self-incrimination, therefore, it
does not seem to have been part of any general spirit of "tenderness" towards the accused, and there seems no basis for associating the incompetency of the accused with any such view. "'
Against all of the disadvantages of allowing the accused to
testify, the opponents of reform saw very few benefits. They argued that a change of this importance, fraught with danger,
should be made only if there was a demonstrated and immediate
need for it. 112 They professed to recognize no such need, dismiss-

ing the reformers' argument that the change was essential to protect innocent defendants. The opponents contended that the defendant would gain nothing from competency to offset the clear
loss to him. They emphasized that the principal benefit adduced
for the Act-that it would give the accused a chance to tell his
story-already existed in the form of the right to make an unsworn statement." 3 They dismissed the notion that the defendant's story would have more weight with the jury because it was
made under oath.114 Under all the circumstances, then, the oppo110 See 2 L. RADZwIowIcz, A HISTORY

OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW

33-167, 307-46

(1956), for a thorough discussion of the private enforcement system.
111For a general history of the privilege against self-incrimination see L. LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968). The relationship between the privilege and the
testimonial disqualification of the accused is also discussed. Id. at 324.
112 See, e.g., 60 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 334 (1898).
113See, e.g., 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1051-52 (1898). For a general history of the unsworn statement, see Z. COWEN & P. CARTER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 205-18
(1956). While the practice varied as to the scope of the statement permitted the defendant
and as to the weight which the factfinder should give it, most jurisdictions allowed the accused to address the jury in some form in an attempt to mitigate the harshness of the rule
of exclusion. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. at 582-87. But see State v. Cameron, 40
Vt. at 565 (Vermont did not allow the defendant to make a statement prior to the enactment of its competency statute). While in most American jurisdictions the right to make
an unsworn statement did not survive the grant of competency, in England the unsworn
statement was expressly preserved by the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898.
114Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. at 221; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. at 566; 60 PARL. DEB.
(4th ser.) 548 (1898); 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1014, 1051 (1898). Some of the opponents
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nents concluded, "[t]he only right a prisoner has not [already] got
is the right of being cross-examined, and that is what it is proposed to confer." One Parliamentary opponent expressed this
argument thus: "I submit that under the present system, which
gives a man perfect freedom to state what he likes, though not to
be cross-examined, a prisoner is in as good a position, and far better than he would be under this Bill."'
The relationship between the unsworn statement and
testimony under oath is clouded by the fact that in England some
opponents of reform argued that competency would deprive defense counsel of one of his most effective arguments to the jury,
"namely, that the mouth of the defendant, who alone knew the
real facts, was unfortunately closed."1 7 That this argument
could have been made was due to the existence of a view, ultimately rejected but apparently quite widespread in the profession and supported by some judicial opinion, that the right to
make an unsworn statement was lost in those cases where the
prisoner availed himself of the right granted him in 1836 of having counsel argue to the jury.118
However prevalent this view may have been among practitioners, it was not the view of the Parliamentary opponents of reform. On the contrary, they argued that it was the supporters of
competency who were trying to create support for the measure
by suggesting that it was the duly way that the defendant could
also argued that the sanction of the oath did little to increase the likelihood that the defendant would tell the truth. Herbert Stephen wrote:
It may once have been true that people were afraid to swear to falsehoods
and that a sworn statement had consequently a kind of mechanical advantage over one which was not sworn. It is certainly not now true of the ordinary English witness .... [Tihe great majority of accused persons, if they
are witnesses at all, are dishonest witnesses, and if a witness means to give
false evidence, I do not believe the fact of being on oath-apart from his liability to be prosecuted for perjury, which is quite a different thing-ever
restrains him in the smallest degree.
Stephen, supra note 77, at 573.
115 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1051 (1898).
116 Id. at 1014.
117 ALVERSTONE, RECOLLECTIONS OF BAR AND BENCH 179 (1915), quoted in 2 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 579, at 706. See 106 Law Times 37 (1898).
118 See Z. COWEN & P. CARTER, supra note 113, at 206-07; 1 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 440-41 (1883); 68 Law Times 301 (1880).
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be heard." 9 This allegation was unfair, since the supporters of reform did not contend that the unsworn statement was unavailable, but only that it was no substitute for sworn testimony. 2 0
Why the opponents did not view the unsworn statement as
vulnerable to many of the same infirmities as sworn testimony is
something of a puzzle. One obvious difference was that the unsworn statement generally was not subject to cross-examination
and it therefore posed fewer risks to the defendant. As a result,
although the inference of guilt might be drawn as much from the
failure to make an unsworn statement as from the failure to testify under oath,' 2 ' the reason for not speaking, and hence the infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination, was less in
the former case. At the same time, however, the risk of perjury
would seem to have been greater under a procedure which allowed no cross-examination. That the opponents were not worried about this in part reflects the anomalous view that many of
them had of perjury, i.e., that falsehood not under oath was not
perjury; in part it may also reflect the view that the unsworn
statement was less likely to be believed by the jury, although such
a view would have undercut the argument that the oath added
nothing to the credibility of the defendant's testimony.
However, the opponents' preference for the unsworn statement is not fully explained by the absence of cross-examination.
In Michigan, for example, prior to the grant of competency the
defendant's unsworn statement was subject to cross-examination. Nevertheless, in the view of the concurring judge in People
v. Thomas, 21 2 it was still preferable to allowing the defendant to
be sworn, at least from the point of view of protecting his privilege against self-incrimination. Judge Campbell's view was de119 See 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 988 (1898).
120 See notes 131-33 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the benefits
flowing from sworn testimony. In some American jurisdictions, where the right to make
an unsworn statement did not exist, it was possible for the supporters of reform to argue
that competency was necessary to allow the defendant to be heard. This was apparently
the case in Vermont. See State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. at 565.
121 Lord Ludlow, a supporter of the Criminal Cases Bill in the House of Lords, said:
"I do not believe that [the accused] not tendering himself as a witness would prejudice him
with the jury any more than his not making a statement." 54 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1183
(1898).
12 9 Mich. 314,316 (1861) (Campbell, J., concurring).
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23
rived in part from the more limited scope of cross-examination.
In large measure, however, it was because there was something
about the oath that he viewed as peculiarly compulsive. Referring to the English practice under which the preliminary examination before a magistrate could be used at trial, but only if not
made under oath, Judge Campbell stated: "The view of the English judges that an oath, even where a party is informed he need
answer no questions unless he pleases, would with most persons
overcome that caution, is I think founded on good reason and experience."' 124 This view of the peculiarly compulsive character of
testimony under oath, while it helps to explain the opponents'
preference for the unsworn statement and is consistent with their
emphasis on the oath as a source of perjury, nevertheless seems
inconsistent with the scorn which they heaped on the oath either
as an incentive to tell the truth or as a factor giving testimony
greater credibility in the eyes of the jury. 2 5
If the opponents' arguments were more complex in the area
of criminal trials than they had been in the area of civil ones, in
the end they were no more successful. The reformers had two
principal arguments: that competency was necessary to protect
innocent defendants, and that it was necessary to achieve a consistent system of procedure. They argued that the exclusion of the
accused was even more illogical than the exclusion of civil parties
had been, since only the defendant was disqualified. As Appleton
stated, "Hearini cases by the halves is but a bad way of getting at
the truth."' 6 Furthermore, this one-sided arrangement was not
only unfair, but also actually encouraged perjury and false accusations. 27 Finally, the incompetency of the accused was asserted

123 Id. at 321.

124 Id. at 318. For a discussion of the English practice, see 1 CHITTY ON CRIMINAL
LAW 69-70 (Philadelphia 1819).
125 See note 114 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the rejection of the

reformers' arguments relative to the incentive and credibility benefits flowing from testimony under oath.
126 Appleton, supranote 21, at 711.

127 See Pitt-Lewis, supra note 73, at 596. One American commentator further argued that the one-sided nature of criminal proceedings placed a premium on the race to
the courthouse to file a complaint. "Thus a man's credibility may sometimes depend on
the length of his legs or the soundness of his lungs." Testimony of Parties,supra note 101,
at 136.
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to undercut the traditional presumption of innocence.' 8 To the

reformers, the extension of competency to the accused was "a
matter of elementary justice,"' 29 necessary to remove "an artificial barrier against the ascertainment of the truth, which it is im3
possible to justify upon any ground of principle or policy."'1
Further, the reformers denied that the unsworn statement
was an adequate substitute for testimony under oath. From the
point of view of the court, it was certainly not as reliable as testimony made under the sanction of the oath and subject to crossexamination. The reformers also disputed the assumption that
testimony under oath was of no benefit-to the accused. In addition to rejecting the assertion that the oath added nothing to the
defendant's credibility, they argued that cross-examination,
while serving to expose the guilty, would at the same time benefit
the innocent. The Earl of Halsbury, Lord Chancellor and the
principal supporter of the Criminal Cases Bill in the House of
Lords, argued:
I know it is said [the accused] can make his statement. My
Lords, that is an absolutely illusory reply. What is wanted is
that he can make his statement so that it may be crossexamined and tested by the judge or magistrate who has to decide to which witness he will give credit. Some people argue as
if their only notion of cross-examination were to puzzle and
confuse an honest witness. My Lords, that is certainly not my
idea of cross-examination, but a real and properly conducted
cross-examination makes the true case more apparent, while it
breaks down falsehood. 131
Sir James Stephen shared the view that cross-examination could
be of assistance to a confused or forgetful witness by directing his
attention to the critical facts at issue. 3 2 Moreover, cross-examina-

128 See Testimony of Parties,supra note 101, at 131-32. See also Appleton, supra
note 21, at 708. Appleton argued that "[t]o exclude for presumed guilt is to determine in
advance and before hearing, and adversely to the prisoner, the question in issue." Id.
12956 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1028 (1898).
13060 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 336 (1898) (Asquith).
13154 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1173 (1898).
132 j.STEPHENsupra note 22, at 194-98.
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tion, even more than the oath, added credibility to the defendant's account.1IThe reformers also disputed the premise that the average defendant would be incapable of giving a forthright, convincing
account of his story to the jury.134 Moreover, they claimed that
the opposition's view placed insufficient faith in the discernment
of the jury: "To suppose such a class of sufferers of this kind, it is
necessary to imagine that, in each case, a stupid person was tried
by an equally stupid jury, and that the jury was as unable to
recognize the truth when they heard it, as the accused was of telling it intelligibly."' The reformers argued that there was no
13
reason why an innocent man should be afraid to take the stand.
That the ability to testify was indeed viewed as a valuable privilege rather than, in effect, a coercive device was shown by the
Michigan Supreme Court's opinion in People v. Thomas,'3
where the issue was whether the defendant could be sworn at his
request under a statute which merely precluded him from being
compelled to testify. The court rejected the defendant's request
PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1004-05, 1028-29 (1898).
134One Parliamentary supporter of the Criminal Cases Bill argued:
113 See 56

It is a very strange thing that [the Bill] should be objected to mainly upon
one ground-that there may be somewhere or other some timid, ignorant,
unwieldly, uncouth witness who, by reason of his personal defects, or want
of mental cultivation, or what not, is liable to be convicted, although he is
innocent, because, although he isinnocent he will somehow or other make it
appear that he is guilty.... Well, of course... there is no possible
method of trying any person against which you cannot raise some imagina.tive case of hardship. Sir, I do not believe it is likely to happen under this
Bill.
56 PARL.DEB. (4th ser.) 1007 (1898).

Pitt-Lewis, A Bill for the Protection of Innocent Prisoners,39 NINETEENTH CEN812, 823 (1896). One Parliamentary supporter of the Criminal Cases Bill suggested
that juries were actually inclined to favor the uneducated, working-class defendant:
As to traps being set for illiterate persons, if a rich City swindler was before
me, as a jury-man, I should be careful how I believed him, but if I had before me in the box an ignorant agricultural laborer, who, from his demeanor, was palpably telling the truth, I should acquit him, because I could see
his story was to be believed. Jurors are not such fools as to be misled by the
appeals of counsel to the extent some honourable Members imagine.
56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1064 (1898).
136 The reformers asserted that cross-examination was powerless against an honest
witness. See 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1005, 1027 (1898).
137 9 Mich. 314.
13

TURY
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to testify, stating that "[i]f the people can not compel him to testify, neither can he force his testimony upon them;" otherwise
8
there would be no "reciprocal rights." 13
The reformers' answer to the self-incrimination concern,
therefore, was to argue that an innocent defendant should have
no reason to avoid testifying. 13 9 Clearly, however, there might be
a reason for a guilty defendant to desire not to take the stand. In
their addresses to Parliament, both the Attorney General and the
Chancellor denied that their purpose was to make conviction of
the guilty easier. 140Others, however, conceded that this would be
an effect of the Act but argued that it was an advantage rather
than a drawback.141 Many of the reformers freely admitted that
the dilemma posed by the opponents-the likelihood of conviction if the accused took the stand and the unfavorable inference
138 Id. at 315.
139The reformers also suggested that, to the extent that the option of speaking
amounted to pressure to speak because of the unfavorable inference that would be drawn
from the failure to do so, the problem already existed in the form of the right to make an
unswom statement. See note 121 supra and the accompanying text for more on the possibility of such prejudice to the defendant.
140 56 P aL.DEB. (4th ser.) 979 (1898) (Attorney General); 54 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.)
1171 (1898) (Earl of Halsbury).
141 Appleton, for example, argued that competency would have the doubly beneficial effect of ensuring that the "[a]cquittal of innocence is thereby more probable, the conviction of guilt more assured." Appleton, supra note 21, at 711. Accord Pitt-Lewis, supra
note 135, at 822-23.
The range of motivations of the reformers is illustrated by the following editorial
in the American Law Register:
For the most part, and especially in this country, legal reform . . .has... fallen into the hands, for the most part, of a class of persons, who seem to be oppressively pervaded with a sense of false sympathy
for every one who comes in any way under the restraints or censures of the
law....
...Itis this class of law reformers that has rendered the whole subject, so far as it applies to criminal procedure, distasteful and almost disgusting to men of conservative sympathies....
...With this class of law reformers Chief Justice Appleton can have
no sympathy. He believes that most men accused of crime are veritably
guilty... and like a sensible man, he advocates the admission of defendants ... to testify in their own behalf, if they so elect, because he expects,
that under the operation of such a law, the guilty will be more sure of conviction and punishment, and that the innocent will be more sure of escape; a
result which every good man ought to desire.... And it is in this view only
that we should feel prepared to give our adhesion to the proposed change.
14 Am.L. REC. 712-13 (1866).
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if he did not-did indeed apply to the guilty defendant, but they
contended that he had only himself to blame for it. 142 The opponents of competency were undoubtedly correct in accusing many
of the advocates of reform of a lack of sensitivity to the accused's
privilege against self-incrimination. Bentham had been a vehement foe of the privilege,143 and many others shared the view that
the rule frustrated the search for truth. One Parliamentary supporter of reform expressed the reformers' attitude:
We are simply desirous that the innocent man should be ac-

quitted and that the guilty man should be convicted. But a
great many Members of this House are much more concerned
in regard to the fate of the guilty man lest he should not be convicted according to the rules of the game. Now, Sir, for that I
care nothing. 144

This statement highlights the ambivalent attitude of the opponents of competency towards the guilty defendant. Their argument was often phrased in terms of the claim that the reformers, in their haste to make the conviction of the guilty easier,
were running roughshod over the innocent. Nevertheless, even
had they accepted the reformers' position that the Act would
benefit the innocent, it is not clear that their opposition would
have evaporated. It was not that they were especially solicitous
about the guilty prisoner himself; rather, they thought the proposed changes would pervert the criminal justice system by
abridging the privilege against self-incrimination and by transforming criminal trials into inquisitorial proceedings. 145 This am-

bivalent attitude was apparent in their perception of the perjury
problem-their concern was partly that competency would give
the guilty an opportunity to lie, partly that it would unfairly
tempt them to lie, and partly that it wouldforce them to lie.14
See Appleton, supra note 21, at 711.
See J. BENTHAM, supra note 14, at 240-45. Appleton was also an opponent of the
privilege. See State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298 (1871).
142
143

14460 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 550-51 (1898).

145 See text accompanying notes 155-59 infra for a discussion of this possible ten-

dency towards an inquisitorial proceeding.
146 The element of coercion to commit perjury was the result of the unfavorable inference that would be drawn from the failure to testify. One member of Parliament noted
that "it had been pointed out with great force that if the Bill was passed it would be abso-
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The reformers, then, argued that the competency of the accused would protect the innocent, unmask the guilty, and generally facilitate the discovery of the truth. They also asserted that
it was necessary in the interests of consistency. They contended
that it was illogical to have one rule in civil cases and another in
criminal ones; 147 moreover, in England, the reformers in the debate of 1898 were able to use as examples a series of recent statutes under which a defendant was rendered competent to testify
in particular cases, with the result that there existed one rule for
newly created statutory offenses and another for older crimes. 4
Further, they argued that the incompetency rule was itself internally inconsistent since it allowed testimony where the rationale
for the rule-whether fear of perjury or protection of the accused-was more seriously implicated than it would be by the
lutely impossible for any prisoner to keep himself out of the witness box." The result would
be that guilty defendants "would be forced to go into the box and perjure themselves by
swearing that they were guiltless." 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1064 (1898) (emphasis added).
In Staples v. State, the Tennessee Supreme Court indicated that the provision
prohibiting the prosecutor from commenting on the accused's failure to testify was necessary to preserve the constitutionality of the competency statute, since "otherwise, a defendant on trial might be put in the awful situation of being requiredto commit perjury to
avoid the consequences of his failure to avail himself of the privilege extended him by the
statute." 89 Tenn. at 233 (emphasis added).
147 See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 21, at 706; Pitt-Lewis, supranote 135, at 814-15.
Some of the critics of competency challenged the analogy between civil and criminal cases
on the grounds that both the stakes and the burdens of proof were different in the two situations. See, e.g., 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1013-14 (1898). Others used the opportunity to
question whether competency had been such a good idea in civil cases, alleging that the result had been a "frightful" increase in the level of perjury. Id. at 1059. Accord Harman v.
Harman, 70 F. 894, 926-27 (7th Cir. 1895) (Jenkins, J.,
dissenting).
148 See, e.g., 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 977-78 (1898) (the Attorney General); PittLewis, supra note 135, at 818. For a list of these statutes, of which the most important was
the Criminal Law Amendment of 1885, see 2 TAYLOR ON EVMENCE 862-63 (12th ed.
1931).
A further argument available to the reformers in England was the example of the
United States, where statutes allowing criminal defendants to give sworn testimony had
been enacted in almost every state. See, e.g., 60 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 679 (1898) (Balfour);
56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 978 (1898) (the Attorney General). The Australian example was
also cited, although one Parliamentary opponent of the Bill argued that the Australian experience supported the arguments of the critics. He alleged that the judges of Victoria,
where a competency statute had been enacted, had "reported that they are against the
present position of the law in Victoria," because of "the constantly-increasing number of
cases of perjury which have been brought about by this change of the law." 60 PARL. DEB.
(4th ser.) 318 (1898).
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testimony of the defendant himself. Many of the most egregious
practices whereby those with a blatant pecuniary interest in the
case had been allowed to testify against the defendant-e.g.,
common informers, reward-seekers, etc.-had been abolished by
the latter half of the nineteenth century when the debate over
competency was in full swing. However, one glaring inconsistency remained-the admission of the-testimony of accomplices
who testified against their confederates in exchange for a pardon
or promise of leniency. 49 The supporters of reform contended
that no principled argument could be made to defend this inconsistency other than the necessity of securing a conviction, an aim
which the opponents of competency expressly disavowed. 10
The advocates of reform were ultimately successful, but the
grant of competency contained two concessions to the concerns
of the critics. First, most of the statutes contained the provision
that no inference could be drawn or comment made on the failure of the accused to testify; indeed, in the United States this was
thought essential to preserve the validity of the statutes under the
fifth amendment.1' Second, most statutes placed limitations on
the scope of cross-examination of the accused. 152
149 See Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 333-35 (1892); J. BENTHAM, supranote
14, at 249; Appleton, supra note 21, at 708. One American advocate of reform wrote: "It
will be noticed that the witness is depraved if he claims to be innocent but pure if he confesses his guilt." Testimony of Parties,supra note 101, at 135.
150 The public policy against allowing the enforcement of the law to be defeated due
to the inability of the prosecution's witnesses to testify had been the reason for the numerous exceptions at common law to the strict rule of incompetency in criminal trials. See
United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203 (1842).
151 See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 488. See also Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. 213;
Staples v. State, 89 Tenn. 231. The Criminal Cases Bill did not contain such a provision as
originally introduced in and passed by the House of Lords; however, it was added by the
House of Commons. See 105 Law Times 549 (1898) (Lord Ludlow).
152 The scope of cross-examination was the subject of considerable debate in England. The Act as proposed and passed contained a provision limiting cross-examination
with regard to the defendant's prior crimes. The Attorney General acknowledged that
many members of Parliament felt that this extended too far towards protecting the accused. 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 984 (1898). On a slightly different note, the Law Times argued:
[I]t is most objectionable to create a hybrid class of witnesses who are, by
statute, enabled to tell only half the truth.... It is unfair to the accused,
because such a person ought to be enabled to give his evidence as fully, and
from as good a position, as if he were not at the moment lying under the stigma of being suspected and accused: while a jury will always hesitate a little
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The delay in the enactment of reform in England is in part
misleading. In the first place, while the total abolition of incompetency was not effected until the Criminal Evidence Act in
1898, a process of gradual statutory provision for the sworn testimony of the accused in particular cases had been in progress for
two decades. 10 Moreover, the failure of Parliament to adopt reform earlier was in large measure attributable to the fact that the
Irish members, deeply suspicious of any government-sponsored
changes in the criminal law, were vigorously opposed to the
Act.' In the end, passage was only secured after Ireland was excluded from its operation.
There was, however, an additional concern which went
more to the substance of the reform. This was a feeling, present
in the United States but seemingly more widespread and deepseated in England, that allowing the accused to be sworn and
cross-examined would pervert the conduct of criminal trials by
transforming them into inquisitorial proceedings. The prosecutor, once called upon to cross-examine, would inevitably become
more partisan: "[I]s it not too sanguine to expect that such a man
would conduct a cross-examination of a prisoner with that calmness and moderation with which English prosecutions are now
conducted?"""s Even worse, the judge would be drawn into the
interrogation of the defendant, both by the rekindling of his professional instincts and in order to prevent injustice in those
cases-which the critics seemed to think would be numerouswhere an inexperienced prosecutor was outmatched by a clever
criminal. 56 According to one critic:
to give entire credit to a witness whom they know is not liable to a complete
and searching cross-examination. It is not fair to the jury, because... every
known means for ascertaining the truth ought... to be placed at their
command.
99 Law Times 104 (1895). Another supporter of the Act acknowledged that "he did not
like the idea of witnesses on one side having privileges not accorded to witnesses on the
other side." 105 Law Times 581 (1898) (J.
Dugdale, Recorder of Birmingham).
The opponents of the Act argued that the reformers seemed unable to resolve the
issue of the scope of cross-examination, noting that previous versions of the Bill had contained no limitation on questioning. See 56 PAmL. DEB. (4th ser.) 986 (1898).
153See note 148 supra for a citation to these statutes.
154See 159 EDINBURGH REv. 332 (1884).
15 56 PAXL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1015 (1898).
156 See id. at 991, 1000; 105 Law Times 581 (1898),
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Would it not be a deplorable thing that a system so generous
and humane should be changed to one in which it would be the
business and the duty of the judge to put questions... and as
the result of which he would not appear to the poor and miserable in a Criminal Court as a friend, as he is now generally regarded, but as an embittered enemy?157
This notion that the judge would be forced into a more active
role by the inadequacy of the prosecution contrasts curiously
with the general picture painted by the opponents of reform of
the helpless defendant collapsing under the pressure of crossexamination.
Therefore, the net effect, according to the opponents, would
have been to "establish in this country precisely that same system
of merciless interrogatories of prisoners

. . .

which unfortunate-

ly has been adopted by almost all the Latin races."'"" The repugnance which such a prospect engendered was manifested in the
charge that it would simply be "un-English." 59
The advocates of reform in part denied that any such fundamental change in procedure would result. 160 In part, however,
they suggested that the "antiquated dogma that the mouth of the
accused is locked, only to be opened at his own will" did not
serve the cause of truth,' and that a step towards the more active examination of the defendant might not be undesirable. One
Parliamentary supporter of the Criminal Evidence Act characterized the existing system as "the practice of looking for the person towards whom circumstances point as being guilty of the offense, and then shutting that person's mouth, and saying, 'Now
we play the game; you be silent, and without any assistance from
you we will settle whether you are guilty or innocent.' "12 More-

157 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1016 (1898).

'-' Id. at 1031.
159 See id. at 1002. Another Parliamentary opponent said: "If you allow and encourage cross-examination of the accused person you would bring our system into line with the
system which prevails in France, and which is so repugnant to English ideas ..
" Id. at
1067-68.
160 See 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1008-09, 1026 (1898).
16' Book Review, 92 N. AM. REv. 297, 317 (1861).
162 56 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 1027 (1898).
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over, they stressed that the questioning of the defendant was not
really "un-English" at all but had in fact been characteristic of
earlier criminal trials in England; it was the denial of access by
the factfinder to the accused that was a comparatively recent innovation. 63 However, even those who suggested that a bit of the
"continental system" might be beneficial emphasized that the
abuses to which the system had fallen prey-notably the interrogation of the accused by the judge and forced confessions-must
be avoided. This they were confident could be done, since "it
does not follow, as seems to be assumed, that because a criminal
trial is in its nature an inquisition, the process by which it is conducted should necessarily be inquisitorial." 14
Two additional factors may possibly have contributed to the
delay in the English enactment of full competency. First, as discussed earlier, the arguments of the English opponents of reform
were colored by class consciousness to an extent not present in the
United States. This led to the conclusion that the average criminal defendant in England would be more likely to perjure himself if guilty and less likely to be able to present a coherent defense if innocent.'6 5
Second, to the extent that the opponents of reform were concerned that inexperienced prosecutors would draw the judge into
the examination of the accused, this may have been a reflection
of the fact that the development of a professional, public prosecutorial system occurred later in England than in the United
States.16

163 See, e.g., J. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 191-95; Book Review, 121 EDINBURGH
REv.109, 132 (1865).
164 Book Review, supra note 163, at 133.
165 See notes 87-90 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of such class-conscious arguments.
166 See generally Kurland & Waters, PublicProsecutionsin England 1854-79:An Essay in English Legislative History, 1959 DUKE L.J. 493. In the United States, where a public prosecutorial system was well in place by the time of the debate over the extension of
competency to the accused, the view of the relative skill of defense and prosecuting counsel was reversed. See [NEW YORK] COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, REPORT
ON CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 207 (1850) (comparing young, inexperienced defense
counsel with seasoned government prosecutor).
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CONCLUSION

The rapid and widespread demise during the nineteenth century of the common law rules of incompetency based on interest
suggests, at first glance, that the admission of the sworn testimony of parties and interested witnesses was simply an idea
whose time had come and thus was accepted largely without
question. As this article has sought to demonstrate, however,
both the scope and sources of opposition were considerable, particularly in the case of the extension of competency to the criminal defendant. While the debate centered on the danger of increased perjury, the extension of competency reflected and implicated a variety of other concerns: judicial economy and consistency; the soundness of exclusionary rules of evidence; the proper
function of the adversary process, especially in criminal trials;
and the increased use of lawyers in the judicial system. To one extent or another, these concerns still reverberate today.

